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## DCI Talking Points for NSPG Meeting 21 April 1983

## Security Dimensions of South Lebanon Situation

An increasing number of attacks on the IDF in southern Lebanon have killed or wounded 5-10 Israelis per week in recent months.

- -- Most of these attacks are probably by PLO groups; FATAH, DFLP or PFLP-GC.
- -- Lebanese Shia unhappy with Israeli occupation probably are responsible for some of the attacks in the past month.
- -- Lebanese leftists allied with the PLO or acting riindependently may also be involved.

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Syrian and Iranian support for the guerrillas and the existence of a sanctuary in northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley facilitate such guerrilla operations. Israel holds the Syrians responsible for permitting Palestinian infiltration and is likely to unleash punitive strikes against Syrian/Palestinian positions in the Bekaa Valley in the near future.

- -- Punitive actions may discourage but will not stop the attacks.
- -- A continued Israeli presence in Lebanon, like a magnet, will attract further attacks, with increasing involvement of Lebanese Muslims resentful of the Israeli occupation.

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Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would reduce or eliminate Lebanese Muslim participation in guerrilla attacks, but PLO fighters would still try to conduct operations against northern Israel.

- -- The Lebanese Army and civilian intelligence probably could stop most terrorist operations and could prevent the restablishment of PLO main force units in the southern security zone.
- -- Major Haddad's forces, familiar with the area, would be invaluable in an anti-terrorist role.

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If the Israeli-Lebanese talks fail or drag on inconclusively the PLO will probably try to augment its forces and 25X1

-- PLO political activities in isolation pose no threat to Lebanon.

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 The danger lies in the possibility that Lebanese Muslims and leftists will again renew their alliance with a rearmed PLO as leverage to assure continued Muslim participation in the Lebanese political process. This development would ensure a stronger PLO and probably	
precipitate a new civil war.	25X1

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